ABSTRACT
We assess the economic and health costs of COVID and policy responses to COVID. Based on initial estimates of health and economic costs, social distancing policies were justified, but these estimates now seem too high because of learning by doing. Significant differences in mortality rates across US states and countries can be explained by population density, climate, exposure, and policy. Regions that were able to contain the disease early have seen fewer deaths and lower economic losses. Some developing countries initially imposed drastic, costly measures, perhaps motivated by political economy. We also find that there has been underinvestment in prevention and mitigation that could have reduced the cost of adaptation and suggest that there is a lesson for climate change policies.
ABSTRACT
We model COVID-19 data for 89 nations and US states with a recently developed formalism that describes mathematically any pattern of growth with the minimum number of parameters. The results show that the disease has a typical duration of 18 days, with a significant increase in fatality when it lasts longer than about 4 months. Searching for correlations between "flattening of the curve" and preventive public policies, we find strong statistical evidence for the impact of the first implemented policy on decreasing the pandemic growth rate; a delay of one week in implementation nearly triples the size of the infected population, on average. Without any government action, the initial outburst still slows down after 36 days, possibly thanks to changes in public behavior in response to the pandemic toll. Stay-at-home (lockdown) was not the first policy of any sample member, and we could not find statistically meaningful evidence for its added impact, similar to a recent study that employed an entirely different approach. However, lockdown was mostly imposed only shortly before the exponential rise was arrested by other measures, too late for a meaningful impact. A third of the sample members that did implement lockdown imposed it only after the outburst had already started to slow down. The possibility remains that lockdown might have significantly shortened the initial exponential rise had it been employed as first resort rather than last.
ABSTRACT
Coronavirus disease 2019 and related lockdown policies in 2020 shocked food industry firms' supply chains in developing regions. Firms "pivoted" to e-commerce to reach consumers and e-procurement to reach processors and farmers. "Delivery intermediaries" copivoted with food firms to help them deliver and procure. This was crucial to the ability of the food firms to pivot. The pandemic was a "crucible" that induced this set of fast-tracking innovations, accelerating the diffusion of e-commerce and delivery intermediaries, and enabling food industry firms to redesign, at least temporarily, and perhaps for the long term, their supply chains to be more resilient, and to weather the pandemic, supply consumers, and contribute to food security. We present a theoretical model to explain these firm strategies, and then apply the framework to classify firms' practical strategies. We focus on cases in Asia and Latin America. Enabling policy and infrastructural conditions allowed firms to pivot and copivot fluidly.
ABSTRACT
Individually, both droughts and pandemics cause disruptions to global food supply chains. The 21st century has seen the frequent occurrence of both natural and human disasters, including droughts and pandemics. Together their impacts can be compounded, leading to severe economic stress and malnutrition, particularly in developing countries. Understanding how droughts and pandemics interact, and identifying appropriate policies to address them together and separately, is important for maintaining a robust global food supply. Herein we assess the impacts of each of these disasters in the context of food and agriculture, and then discuss their compounded effect. We discuss the implications for policy, and suggest opportunities for future research.